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who seeks general information and is not very particular about minor points. Psychologically it has rare importance ; it is an almost perfect record of how even the best and most intelligent Confederates came in time, and by unconscious and even amiable self-deception to believe that secession was the necessary result of their sacred reverence for the strict letter of the Constitution.

FREDERIC BANCROFT.

The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy. By JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, Ph.D. (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press. 1901. Pp. 291.)

THE material for writing a history of the diplomatic relations of the Southern Confederacy is quite abundant, but it is scattered through a great variety of publications. Much of it is to be found in the biographies of the public men who conducted the affairs of the inchoate government, in the narratives of naval and financial agents sent abroad by that government, in the published Rebellion archives, in magazine articles, and, lastly, in the unpublished archives of the Confederate State department now in possession of the Federal government.

It has been the task of Professor Callahan to gather into a consecutive narrative, for the first time, this diverse and scattered material and give to the public a sketch of the diplomatic history of the Confederacy. A small book of less than three hundred pages on such a subject must necessarily be only a sketch, as its compass precludes the production of documents or any detailed account of events. The author was well fitted for the task, as he is devoting his life to this class of work, and has already given to the public a number of volumes on kindred topics. The reader will find that the task has been well and impartially done, and that he is furnished with a very interesting account of this most important branch of the Confederacy's efforts and failures.

If the work is examined with the critic's eye there will be found a few, not many, defects. The narrative of events is sometimes repeated in different chapters, and occasionally in almost identical language. This is allowable, in fact proper, in presenting the subject by way of lectures to students at intervals of time, but should have been corrected in book form. There are abundant citations of authorities which are helpful to students and useful to the general reader, but they are not always complete. A citation of "Nicolay and Hay's *Lincoln*," which is given more than once, without designating volume or page, is very inadequate in referring to a work of ten volumes.

Professor Callahan shows that the great object of all Confederate diplomatic effort, and in reality the chief hope of the success of the Confederacy, was to secure European intervention, especially that of Great Britain and France. It was apparent to the thoughtful men of the South that it was an ill-matched contest of arms ; that with the overwhelming preponderance of the North in men and material resources the

end was not doubtful, unless one or more of the powerful nations of Europe could be induced to intervene. And there was entertained a confident expectation that such intervention would occur. It is a curious speculation whether secession would ever have been attempted, if men in high places in Europe had not held out hope of governmental action which in the end proved illusory and vain. The narrative of the two missions—first, of Yancey, Rost and Mann and, second, of Mason and Slidell—are full of interest. The exaltation of spirits at the opening of the contest, when Europe seemed convinced that the Union was hopelessly dissevered, and when it was believed the proclamations of neutrality would soon be followed by intervention; the depression that came when it was found that British neutrality was not to be a thin disguise for material aid to the Confederacy, and that Napoleon's ready promises were to have no practical result; the alternate rejoicing and disappointment in London and Paris at Confederate victories and defeats; the duplicity of the French court and the machinations conducted with the British nobility and capitalists—all these furnish the material of a well told story.

One of the most noticeable features of the book is the strong and favorable light in which British neutrality is brought out. Lord John Russell acknowledges his error in allowing the *Alabama* to escape; and, if we except that blunder and his suffering the anterior cruisers to go to sea, it would be difficult to find in the Confederate archives any evidence on the part of the British ministry of partiality for the South. The first commissioners were seen by Russell once only and then in a private way. Mason, who was especially accredited to London, never secured any official standing, and his letters are a constant series of reports of the unfriendliness and alleged incivility of the ministry; and before the war is half over we find Benjamin, Secretary of State, directing him to leave London when his stay was "no longer conducive to the interests nor consistent with the dignity of the Confederacy."

When secession occurred "cotton was king," at least in the eyes of Southern statesmen, and through a "cotton famine" it was believed England would be induced to stop the war. The blockade of the southern ports which brought much embarrassment to Confederate operations was the objective point through which intervention was to be brought about by the diplomatic agents. They felt sure that Great Britain would not tolerate such an interruption of the world's commerce. The narrative under review shows how earnestly they labored to this end and how signally they failed. England was convinced that a people, who within a few months could improvise a navy so numerous and so strong as to blockade effectually twenty-five hundred miles of sea-coast, was a power not lightly to be provoked.

It is curious to note the arguments which were presented to the British ministry and public to influence their action. These appear in the instructions of Secretary Benjamin and in the correspondence and conversations of the diplomatic and other agents of the Confederacy. The effort was constantly made to have it appear that the cause or origin

of the secession movement was commercial, the tariff, the unjust and discriminating taxation; that the new government was based upon free trade; and the most liberal promises were held out as to its commercial policy.

The author shows how fallacious were these assertions, that the moving cause of the war was slavery, and that the British public could not be misled by such specious promises. Neither were the Southern commissioners long in discovering what was the moral conviction of the English people. Yancey, who headed the first commission, reported to President Davis "that English feeling was so strong against slavery that the Government would hardly dare to give any help that would tend to perpetuate the institution." And when at last the ruling spirits of the Rebellion awoke to the situation, and Congress and Mr. Davis decided to agree to emancipation, the commissioners were told by their leading British friends "that it was too late to secure recognition by the abolition of slavery."

The book shows us that the diplomatic affairs of the Confederacy were in the hands of able men, and while they completely failed in their great object, it was because of the situation, and not from any want of skill on their part. The narrative also brings out strikingly the effectiveness of the efforts of Seward and Charles Francis Adams. The Confederates were greatly disappointed over the peaceful settlement of the "Trent affair," which turned English public opinion much to the side of the United States. In a spirit of spitefulness, Mason, after several months of irritating experience in London writes Benjamin: "The British Government shuts its eyes to accumulating proof, . . . and relies on the open mendacity of Seward." It was a marked evidence of the influence of the United States among the nations even forty years ago, that a great and heroic people could for four years maintain a widely extended war with armies numbering hundreds of thousands, and disorganize the commerce and industries of the world, and yet fail to secure the recognition of a single government. The story of these events, so attractively and impartially narrated by Professor Callahan, forms one of the most interesting episodes of modern history.

JOHN W. FOSTER.

Currency and Banking in the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay.

By ANDREW MCFARLAND DAVIS. Part I., Currency; Part II., Banking. [Publications of the American Economic Association. Third Series, Vol. I., No. 4.] (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1901. Pp. xiv, 473; xii, 332.)

HERE is a solid piece of work in a new field well worth tilling. As for its solidity every chapter and page has weight and place in the book. Mr. Davis does indeed intimate that what he has written on the Massachusetts coinage might have been left out, in view of Professor Sumner's articles, which Mr. Davis had not seen. But we do not agree